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 Abstract 
 
Starting from the findings of an earlier compliance study covering the fifteen ‘old’ member 
states of the European Union, which identified three ‘worlds of compliance’, this paper seeks 
to establish whether or not the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
represent a separate world of compliance. We present empirical findings from a research 
project on the implementation of three EU Directives from the field of working time and equal 
treatment in four CEE countries. The evidence suggests that the new member states display 
implementation styles that are similar to a few countries in the EU15. The expectation that 
the new member states might behave according to their own specific logic, such as 
significantly decreasing their compliance efforts after accession in order to take ‘revenge’ for 
the strong pressure of conditionality, is not supported by our case studies. Instead, all four 
new member states appear to fall within a group that could be dubbed the ‘world of dead 
letters’. It is crucial to highlight, however, that this specific ‘world of compliance’, 
characterised by politicised transposition processes and systematic application and 
enforcement problems, also includes two countries from the EU15. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Ausgehend von einer früheren Implementationsstudie über die 15 ‚alten’ Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europäischen Union, deren Hauptergebnis eine Typologie von drei ‚Welten der 
Rechtsbefolgung’ war, geht dieser Beitrag der Frage nach, ob die neuen Mitgliedstaaten aus 
Mittel- und Osteuropa (MOE) eine zusätzliche Ländergruppierung mit einem eigenen 
Implementationsstil bilden. Wir präsentieren Ergebnisse eines Forschungsprojekts über die 
Implementation von drei EU-Richtlinien aus den Bereichen Arbeitszeit und Gleich-
behandlung in vier MOE-Ländern. Unseren Befunden zufolge ähneln die beobachteten 
Implementationsmuster der neuen Mitgliedstaaten denen einer kleinen Gruppe von Staaten 
innerhalb der EU15. Keine Unterstützung liefern unsere empirischen Ergebnisse dagegen 
für die Erwartung, die neuen Mitgliedstaaten könnten einer eigenen Logik bei der Befolgung 
von EU-Recht folgen, etwa in Gestalt eines deutlich laxeren Umgangs mit europäischen 
Rechtsvorschriften nach dem Beitritt als ‚Vergeltung’ für den hohen Vorbeitrittsdruck. 
Insgesamt lassen sich alle vier untersuchten Länder in eine Gruppe einordnen, die wir als 
‚Welt des toten Rechts’ bezeichnen. Diese Welt, die durch politisierte Umsetzungsprozesse 
und systematische Probleme bei der praktischen Anwendung und beim Vollzug 
gekennzeichnet ist, umfasst jedoch nicht nur MOE-Länder, sondern auch zwei ‚alte’ 
Mitgliedstaaten. 
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Introduction1 
Non-respect of jointly adopted rules and policies has already been a significant problem in 
the fifteen ‘old’ member states of the European Union (EU). In May 2004, ten additional 
member states joined the EU. With Malta, Cyprus, and eight countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEECs) being part of the club, however, the issue of compliance with EU 
legislation has become even more pressing. The CEECs are transition states not only 
regarding their economies but also their political and legal systems. Most of them still have a 
long way to go to achieve fully-fledged democratic systems with stable institutions and 
societies that respect the rule of law regularly in everyday life. At the same time, it does not 
make sense for the EU to adopt intricate rules for a unified market, if they remain dead letter 
in a large part of the Union. Being well aware of potential problems in the applicant states, 
the European Commission already made compliance with EU policies a priority during the 
period preceding the 2004 enlargement (see official statements such as, for example, the 
Governance White Paper: CEC, 2001). 
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania, two countries with even graver problems in the field 
of court systems and the rule of law, yet again increased the exigency of compliance with EU 
rules. Despite much preparatory work in both countries, the European Commission still 
needed to express great concerns in its 2006 monitoring reports: ‘Bulgaria needs to 
demonstrate clear evidence of results in the fight against corruption, in terms of 
investigations and judicial proceedings. It also needs to further reform the judiciary, in 
particular to reinforce its transparency, efficiency and impartiality’ (CEC, 2006d, p. 1). The 
Commission furthermore pressed for more efficient and systematic implementation of laws 
for the fight against fraud and corruption. Romania was also said to need to ‘demonstrate 
further results in the fight against corruption. It also needs to consolidate the implementation 
of the ongoing justice reform and further enhance the transparency, efficiency and 
impartiality of the judiciary’ (ibid., p. 3). Alarming assessments of similar nature may be found 
in the Commission’s progress reports on Croatia and Macedonia – the two candidate 
countries that currently appear to be furthest advanced in their rapprochement with the EU 
(CEC, 2006a, pp. 7-8; 2006b, pp. 7-11). Problems with the domestic fulfilment of EU 
legislation will thus remain a hot topic in the years to come. 
                                                       
1 This paper is part of a larger research project on the transposition and application of EU Directives in new member 
states funded by the Austrian Ministry of Science under the TRAFO programme for transdisciplinary research (for 
details see http://www.ihs.ac.at/index.php3?id=1144). Thanks to our collaborators Elisabeth Holzleithner, 
Emmanuelle Causse, Petra Furtlehner, Marianne Schulze and Clemens Wiedermann for their important input and to 
the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence for hosting Gerda 
Falkner while she was writing her part of this paper. An earlier version was presented at the ECPR’s 3rd Pan-
European Conference on EU Politics, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006. We would like to thank the panellists and 
our discussant Andrea Lenschow as well as Sylvia Kritzinger and two anonymous referees for their helpful 
comments. 2 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
The major approach to date in the field of enlargement studies regarding CEECs’ adaptation 
performance has been the ‘external incentives model’. It highlights the fact that where rule 
adoption was successful, it had been driven mainly by the membership ‘carrot’ promised to 
the candidates by the EU as an external actor. Accordingly, relevant scholars expected that 
‘the absence of these incentives should significantly slow down or even halt the 
implementation process’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a, p. 226; see also 
Schimmelfennig, Engert and Heiko, 2005, p. 29; 2005b, p. 28; Linden, 2002, p. 371). The 
finding that conditionality as an external incentive was the key mechanism that led to the 
adoption of EU rules by the candidates makes the question of post-accession compliance 
even more salient (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 677; 2005a, p. 226; 
Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2004, p. 180). However, it has only been possible to study the 
CEECs’ behaviour after accession in the few years since their joining the EU. Earlier work on 
pre-accession compliance with EU law clearly cannot be generalised beyond the ‘age of 
carrots and sticks’ when membership was still an important incentive to comply with anything 
the EU might demand. The ‘logic of control’ which prevailed during the negotiation phase has 
now come to an end, and different dynamics are to be expected (Maniokas, 2004; 
Sedelmeier, 2006).  
Now that accession has been completed, therefore, it is high time to study how the new CEE 
member states actually perform in implementing EU legislation. To answer this question, this 
article presents findings from a comparative project on the transposition, enforcement and 
application of EU legislation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, carried 
out in 2005 and 2006.
 We specifically look at EU law in the fields of working time and of 
equal treatment in the workplace. Most of the EU provisions we study had to be implemented 
before accession. Some of them, however, were due to be fulfilled by October 2005, that is, 
after the CEECs had joined the EU. In addition, we screened the relevant reform activities 
both before and after accession. Therefore, we are in a position to address not only 
implementation efforts in the pre-accession phase but also post-accession compliance, 
although more cases and a longer period of observation would certainly be needed to 
generate a definite assessment. 
Our qualitative case studies rely on expert interviews with administrators; on focus group 
discussions involving those directly concerned with the relevant laws, or their 
representatives; as well as on the scarce literature available in the field. On the conceptual 
level, this study builds on an earlier compliance study covering the EU15, which identified 
country clusters, each with its own typical implementation mode. These three ‘worlds of 
compliance’ (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, chapter 15) will be summarised in the 
next section. Section 2 then outlines some reasons to expect that the CEECs might actually 
form a specific group within the EU27. Section 3 presents empirical findings on the four 
countries studied from the field of working time and equal treatment. The conclusions finally 
discuss similarities and differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states of the EU. As I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 3 
a result of this, we will present ideas for a conceptual design of not only three but four worlds 
of compliance in the EU27. 
1. Three Worlds of Compliance in the EU15 
Our earlier study analysed the national transposition, enforcement, and application of six EU 
labour law Directives in the fifteen ‘old’ member states. The results of our qualitative study of 
90 implementation cases indicated that there is no single overriding factor which determines 
the compliance performance and could thus serve as a safe anchor for predicting the 
success or failure of future implementation cases in all of our fifteen countries (Falkner, 
Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, p. 317).
2 Even the two theoretically best-established 
hypotheses (on misfit
3 and veto players
4) had at best very weak explanatory power. A closer 
look at our qualitative case studies revealed that even their basic rationale did not hold in 
some clusters of countries (Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib, 2007). As a solution, we offered a 
typology of three worlds of compliance within the EU15, each of which is characterised by an 
ideal-typical implementation style. 
In the world of law observance, the compliance goal typically overrides domestic concerns. 
Even if there are conflicting national policy styles, interests or ideologies, transposition of EU 
Directives is usually both in time and correct. This is supported by a ‘compliance culture’ in 
the sense of an issue-specific ‘shared interpretive scheme’ (Douglas, 2001, p. 3149), a ‘set 
of cognitive rules and recipes’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967, quoted in Swidler, 2001, p. 
3064). Application and enforcement of the national implementation laws is also 
characteristically successful, as the transposition laws tend to be well considered and well 
adapted to the specific circumstances and enforcement agencies as well as court systems 
are generally well-organised and equipped with sufficient resources to fulfil their tasks. Non-
compliance, by contrast, typically occurs only rarely and not without fundamental domestic 
traditions or basic regulatory philosophies being at stake. In addition, instances of non-
compliance tend to be remedied rather quickly. The three Nordic member states (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden) belong to this country cluster. 
                                                       
2 The research team conducted more than 180 expert interviews with experts from the ministries, interest groups 
and labour inspections in the fifteen member states. They covered six labour law Directives from the 1990s, 
concerning written information on contractual employment conditions (91/533/EEC); parental leave (96/34/EC); 
working time (93/104/EC); and the protection of pregnant (92/85/EEC), young (94/33/EC) and part-time workers 
(97/81/EC). Special acknowledgements go to Miriam Hartlapp and Simone Leiber, our two partners on the project 
and co-authors of our joint book, whose research greatly contributed to the project findings. 
3 This approach rests on historical and/or sociological institutionalist reasoning which focuses on the ‘stickiness’ of 
established policies and administrative routines (see e.g. March and Olsen, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 
Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000). If European rules do not match existing traditions, 
implementation is expected to be controversial and/or disrespected during the implementation phase (e.g. Duina, 
1997, 1999; Duina and Blithe, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 2000).  
4 According to George Tsebelis (1995), the reform capacity of a political system decreases as the number of 
decisive actors increases. It follows that EU countries with higher numbers of veto players should have more 
problems with enacting transposition legislation in order to incorporate EU standards than systems with low 
numbers of veto players (see e.g. Haverland, 2000). 4 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
Obeying EU rules is at best one goal among many in the world of domestic politics. 
Domestic concerns frequently prevail if there is a conflict of interests, and each single act of 
transposing an EU Directive tends to happen on the basis of a fresh cost–benefit analysis. 
Transposition is likely to be timely and correct where no domestic concerns dominate over 
the fragile aspiration to comply. In cases of a manifest clash between EU requirements and 
domestic interest politics, non-compliance is the likely outcome. While in the countries 
belonging to the world of law observance breaking EU law would not be a socially 
acceptable state of affairs, it is much less of a problem in one of the countries in this second 
category. At times, their politicians or major interest groups even openly call for disobedience 
with European duties – an appeal that is not met with much serious condemnation in these 
countries. Since administrations and judiciaries generally work effectively, application and 
enforcement of transposition laws are not a major problem in this world – the main obstacle 
to compliance is political resistance at the transposition stage. Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the UK belong to this type. 
In the countries forming the world of transposition neglect,
5 compliance with EU law is not a 
goal in itself. Those domestic actors who call for more obedience thus have even less of a 
sound cultural basis for doing so than in the world of domestic politics. At least as long as 
there is no powerful action by supranational actors, transposition obligations are often not 
recognised at all in these ‘neglecting’ countries. A posture of ‘national arrogance’ (in the 
sense that indigenous standards are typically expected to be superior) may support this, as 
may administrative inefficiency. In these cases, the typical reaction to an EU-related 
implementation duty is inactivity. After an intervention by the European Commission, the 
transposition process may finally be initiated and may even proceed rather swiftly. The result, 
however, is often correct only at the surface. Where literal translation of EU Directives takes 
place at the expense of careful adaptation to domestic conditions, for example, shortcomings 
in enforcement and application are a frequent phenomenon. Potential deficiencies of this 
type, however, do not belong to the defining characteristics of the world of transposition 
neglect. Instead, negligence at the transposition stage is the crucial factor in this cluster of 
countries, which includes France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal.
6 
The typology can be used as a filter that decides which explanatory factors are relevant for 
different countries and what the direction of their influence is. In this sense, crucial 
theoretical propositions in EU implementation research, including the misfit and the veto 
player approaches, are only ‘sometimes-true theories’ (Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib, 2007). 
                                                       
5 Building on the results of our new study on compliance in Central and Eastern Europe, we now suggest to slightly 
reformulate the label of this world (previously: ‘world of neglect’). 
6 The attentive reader will have noticed that two of the ‘old’ member states, Ireland and Italy, have not been 
assigned to any of the above country clusters. In our original work, we subsumed these two countries under the 
overall heading of what we then called the ‘world of neglect’ (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, pp. 339-40). 
However, against the background of our new research on Central and Eastern Europe, the results of which will be 
summarised below, we decided to revise this assignment and include both countries into a fourth cluster. See the 
Conclusions for a detailed discussion of the revised scheme. I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 5 
The point is that implementation processes tend to depend on different factors within each of 
the various worlds. The compliance culture in the field can explain many cases in the world 
of law observance. In the world of domestic politics, transposition is decisively influenced by 
the extent to which the EU’s rules match the political preferences of political parties and 
major interest groups, while application and enforcement are generally effective. In the world 
of transposition neglect, the decisive factor is administrative inertia at the transposition stage, 
caused by countervailing bureaucratic interests or malfunctioning routines. Given the huge 
problems in transposition, practical implementation is of secondary importance. 
Since the EU has recently grown to include ten more member states, most importantly eight 
states from the CEECs, it is now time to study the relationship between typical 
implementation patterns in the EU15, on the one hand, and those of the new members, on 
the other. The following section will outline some typical features of the transition states in 
order to provide some reasoned expectations for the ensuing discussion of the main 
question of this paper: do the new CEE member states form a distinct world of compliance 
within the enlarged European Union, or can they be subsumed under any of the three worlds 
prevalent in the fifteen ‘old’ member states? 
 
2. Specific Characteristics of the New CEE Member 
States                     
A number of aspects suggest that the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe 
might have even more problems with applying and enforcing the law than there already are 
for some countries in the old EU15. One relevant feature in this regard could be literal 
transposition of Directives, which has been described as a frequent phenomenon (see e.g. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007; Sissenich, 2002, p. 299); this implies a lack of 
adaptation to specific circumstances in each country as well as an absence of broad 
consultation of affected groups during the preparation of the laws; both are factors 
traditionally believed to impinge on good overall compliance (see the political science 
theories on policy implementation as reviewed in Pülzl and Treib, 2006; Treib, 2006). Another 
well-known  characteristic of countries is the prevailing weakness of civil society 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003, p. 498; Sissenich, 2002). This suggests that less 
cases of non-compliance will be detected and pursued by collective actors (such as trade 
unions) which could, in principle, more easily and effectively fight for social rights than 
individuals (on the importance of civil society as a factor in differential Europeanisation, see 
also the work by Vivien Schmidt, e.g. 2002). These factors can be interpreted to suggest a 6 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
rather systematic pattern
7 for the CEECs, with significantly worse application and 
enforcement of EU law than in many of the ‘old’ EU member states.  
Such considerations tie in with a number of earlier studies indicating for the pre-membership 
phase that ‘many EU rules have been only formally transposed into national legislation but 
are not fully or reliably implemented’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a, p. 226; see 
also Sissenich, 2005; Leiber, 2005, p. 25). Klaus Goetz questions not only the capacity on 
the part of the new member states to ensure compliance but, at least in some instances, also 
their willingness to do so (Goetz, 2005, p. 276). Be that as it may, application failures can in 
the long run be crucial for the overall success in implementing EU law, and neglectful 
enforcement of a Directive’s standards may counterbalance dutiful performance by a 
member state during the transposition stage. 
Therefore, it seems high time to look more closely at the practice of compliance with EU law 
in CEE member states. In doing so, we will pay attention to the following questions: 
•  Do the new CEE member states fit one of the patterns captured by the three worlds 
of compliance? 
•  If so, do they all fall into one of the worlds, or are they distributed across these 
categories? 
•  If not, do we need a fourth ‘world of compliance’? One possibility could be a kind of 
‘world of revenge’ where after the achievement of membership, the former 
candidates show signs of late protest against the way in which the pre-accession 
phase was handled by the EU (for hints in this direction, see e.g. Goetz, 2005, p. 
273; Ágh, 2003). This could be a form of resistance against adaptation, now that the 
threat of conditionality is gone and nothing quite serious can happen in cases of 
non-compliance – except for the quite long-term perspective of having significant 
fines imposed by the European Court of Justice.  
To answer these questions, the following sections will summarise the empirical results of our 
project in the fields of working time regulation and equal treatment in the workplace. 
 
                                                       
7 In the words of Klaus Goetz, this might then be another example of ‘clustered Europeanization’ (Goetz, 2006). I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 7 
3. The Implementation of EU Legislation on Working 
Time and Equal Treatment in Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic 
The three Directives selected for our study are among the most important pieces of EU 
legislation in the field of social policy. All of them gave rise to major implementation problems 
in the ‘old’ member states (Prondzynski, 1987, 1988; CEC, 2004; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp 
and Leiber, 2005, chapter 13). Against this background, how did the new member states 
from Central and Eastern Europe comply with these three Directives? 
Transposition Patterns: Domestic Politics Dominates the Scene 
The Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC)
8 required surprisingly few legal adaptations in the 
four selected CEE countries. All of them could start from older provisions on maximum 
weekly working hours, rest periods, breaks and annual leave. Nevertheless, the existing 
legislation had to be updated and specified in order to fulfil the detailed requirements of the 
EU’s working time regime. For example, Slovenia had to reduce maximum statutory weekly 
working hours, including overtime, from 50 to 48 hours, increase annual leave entitlements 
by two days and introduce specific night work regulations. The other three countries were 
faced with similar gradual reforms of their existing legal frameworks governing working time. 
Although the degree of legal misfit was not particularly high, transposition of the Working 
Time Directive gave rise to fierce political controversies in all four countries. The main bone 
of contention was the flexibilisation of existing rules and the extent to which the exemption 
and derogation options offered by the Directive should be used.  
In Slovakia, the transposition process was dominated by the centre-right Dzurinda 
government’s deregulation plans. As a consequence, the government made full use of the 
flexibility offered by the Directive, incorporating a minimalist version of the Directive into 
domestic law. In particular, individual employers were allowed to negotiate more flexible 
working time rules with their workers without union participation. The weak Slovak trade 
unions were not able to prevent this decentral system of company-level agreements, which 
was clearly modelled on the British scheme. The same was true for the Hungarian unions, 
which were not able to stop the centre-right government under prime minister Viktor Orbán 
from using most of the derogations and flexibility offered by the Directive, even if, to a certain 
extent, most of the provisions adopted previously existed. In Slovenia, the transposition 
                                                       
8 In our recent project, we studied the consolidated version of the original 1993 Directive, which also comprises the 
standards of a number of subsequent Directives enacted to extend the working time regime to sectors and 
professions that were originally excluded from the Directive’s scope. This is because the applicant countries had to 
comply not only with the 1993 Directive but with the whole set of legal provisions in the field of working time 
regulation. 8 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
process was also marked by debates about increasing the flexibility of the existing working 
time regime. There, however, the government and the social partners agreed on a tripartite 
compromise that safeguarded a number of protective provisions that employers had 
previously called into question. In the Czech Republic, finally, the unions sided with the 
centre-left Zeman government and thus succeeded in rejecting the employers’ calls for more 
flexibility. In the end, therefore, transposition of the Working Time Directive in the Czech 
Republic turned out to be relatively favourable to employees.  
Despite the considerable controversies surrounding the transposition, all four countries 
managed to transpose the Working Time Directive on time and essentially correctly. The 
most important legal shortcomings refer to the ECJ’s case law on on-call duties,
9 which most 
of our four countries have so far not complied with. Due to the massive costs of rearranging 
the shift systems in hospitals, emergency medical services and similar workplaces, however, 
many ‘old’ member states have also failed to give effect to this case law so far. Moreover, a 
process of revising the Directive is currently in process at the European level. These 
revisions also include a change to the definition of working time to the effect that on-call 
duties would no longer be treated as working time. The transposition problems associated 
with the ECJ rulings would thus cease to exist.
10 
The two equality Directives, the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC, amended by 
2002/73/EC) and the Employment Framework Directive (2000/78/EC), created much more 
adaptation pressure in the four countries. The goal of the two Directives is to ban work-
related discriminations on grounds of gender, age, religion or belief, sexual orientation and 
disability. Although all four countries had rather wide-ranging constitutional provisions on 
anti-discrimination, these provisions were generally not applicable to private employment 
relationships and needed much more specification to fulfil the detailed requirements of the 
Directives. This was true for the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In Slovakia, it was especially 
homosexuals and other sexual minorities who lacked protection from work-related 
discrimination, while Hungary was only required to implement a number of gradual 
improvements.  
Despite these (at least partly) significant reform requirements, three of our four countries 
managed to fulfil the main provisions of the Directive largely on time. The transposition laws 
of some countries even go far beyond the minimum standards prescribed by the Directives. 
The anti-discrimination acts in Hungary and Slovenia, both of which were enacted by centre-
left governments, thus covered many more grounds of discrimination than laid down in 
European legislation, and they extended the scope of the whole non-discrimination principle 
beyond the area of employment, although this would have been required for some aspects 
                                                       
9 See the Court’s Judgments in the cases C-303/98 (SIMAP) and C-151/02 (Jäger). 
10 For the purpose of our project, we thus do not treat these problems as violations of the Directive as such, but as 
cases of non-compliance with ECJ rulings. I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 9 
only. Regardless of this considerable over-implementation, the transposition processes in 
Hungary and Slovenia could be completed relatively swiftly, primarily due to the 
determination of the two centre-left governments to push through these reforms, backed up 
by trade unions and civil society organisations. This is not true for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, where especially Christian-democratic parties opposed the creation of far-reaching 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
In the Czech Republic, it was primarily the Christian-democratic KDU-ČSL, part of the 
governing coalition with the Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the Liberals (US-DEU) since 
2002, that dragged its heels on the adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination act. After 
adoption of the bill had failed repeatedly, the Chamber of Deputies approved the draft in 
early 2006. However, the conservative-dominated Senate rejected the draft. Therefore, it 
was sent back to the Chamber of Deputies for a second voting. However, the governing 
coalition failed to organise an absolute majority, which would have been required for this 
second vote to be successful. Therefore the draft finally failed. Instead, the legal situation 
continues to be marked by the results of a first step of transposition: a complex arrangement 
of individual legal provisions scattered over a multitude of laws. These laws are marked by 
several shortcomings if compared to the European standards. Most importantly, the Czech 
Republic has so far failed to create a proper Equal Treatment Body, which is meant to 
provide assistance to victims, conduct its own surveys and publish independent reports 
about equality issues. Yet, this case also shows that transposition efforts did not come to a 
halt after the Czech Republic had joined the EU and after the instrument of conditionality had 
thus ceased to be at the disposal of the Commission. The efforts to create a comprehensive 
anti-discrimination act, although they failed in the end, clearly demonstrate that the Czech 
government continued its transposition efforts after May 2004. 
In Slovakia, members of parliament and ministers from the Christian democratic KDH openly 
opposed the creation of legal provisions to guarantee the equal treatment of homosexuals. 
This resistance could only be overcome after members of the opposition parties agreed to 
vote with the other coalition partners in order to get the transposition bill adopted without the 
votes of the Christian democrats.  
In sum, the transposition record of the four new member states with regard to the three 
Directives in our sample is considerably better than that of the EU15. Although some of the 
provisions in our sample had to be complied with after accession only, most of them were 
subject to the Commission’s pre-accession pressure. Conditionality may thus serve as one 
important explanation for the relatively good transposition performance of our countries. At 
the same time, this does not imply that implementation efforts significantly decreased once 
accession had been accomplished. As the above overview clearly demonstrates, moreover, 
the transposition processes were often marked by political battles between different political 
parties and interest groups. These battles clearly left their stamp on the substance of the 
resulting transposition legislation, with left-wing governments tending to opt for more 10 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
employee-friendly, over-implemented versions of the Directives and centre-right 
governments preferring more minimalist solutions. All of these characteristics are very similar 
to what we identified as the typical transposition processes in the world of domestic politics 
(Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, chapter 15). 
Application and Enforcement: Dead Letters Galore 
The picture changes significantly if we look at the enforcement and application stage. The 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are all plagued by a multitude of problems 
that have so far largely prevented the legislation from being realised in practice. The huge 
gap between the law on the books and the practice on the ground also suggests that the 
observation of relatively low degrees of adaptation pressure in legal terms needs to be 
qualified considerably. As the poor enforcement and application performance of the four 
countries obviously also pertained to the pre-existing legislation, the ‘real’ changes that the 
Directives called for were much more severe than suggested by an exclusive focus on the 
legal sphere.
11 
In the field of working time, many employees voluntarily work longer hours than allowed by 
the law because they need the extra pay to earn a living. This is a phenomenon that has 
already been observed in other low-wage countries such as, e.g., Ireland (Falkner, Treib, 
Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, pp. 114-15). Among the sectors where working excessive 
overtime is particularly widespread is health-care, where shift systems and on-call duties 
result in working hours that by far exceed the limits laid down in the European Directive. 
Major problems with overtime working were also reported from building, transport, 
agriculture, tourism and seasonal work, commerce, the food industry and catering. With 
regard to equality in the workplace, discriminatory practices, especially to the detriment of 
women and homosexuals, are still a widespread phenomenon in the four countries. There is 
a tendency among employers not to hire younger women because they might become 
pregnant. Additionally, women are often discriminated with regard to promotion, which is best 
witnessed by the low share of women in higher positions. Moreover, many women are 
confronted with sexual harassment by their male colleagues or superiors. Homosexuals 
often do not disclose their sexual orientation vis-à-vis their employers or colleagues for fear 
of being discriminated. The way in which high-ranking Christian democratic politicians in 
Slovakia openly agitated against the employment of homosexuals in schools shows that 
such fears are not ill-founded. 
The bulk of these application problems may be explained by shortcomings in the countries’ 
enforcement systems. The most important of these are the following: 
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operationalisation of the misfit concept (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, pp. 27-32). I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 11 
(1) A lack of individual litigation from below: The first major obstacle for employment 
legislation to become reality in the workplaces of the four countries is the lack of active 
litigation by employees. This has a number of reasons. As the introduction of the new laws 
was not accompanied by effective information campaigns either by the governments, by 
lower-level public authorities or by civil-society actors, employees often do not know what 
their rights are. Moreover, many employees do not dare to file complaints against their 
employer because they are afraid of losing their jobs in return. Although the equality 
Directives explicitly rule out such retaliatory action by employers, our information on 
everyday practice in the four CEE countries suggests that this provision has not been 
effective in overcoming litigation reluctance. The problem seems to be particularly severe in 
post-socialist countries such as our four CEECs, where many employees were used to life-
long job security. As a result of the socialist heritage, finally, individual court actions have 
been introduced as an alien element of enforcement after 1989. Therefore, there is no 
litigation culture among the citizens of the four countries. 
(2) A lack of support by civil society actors: Trade unions and other civil society actors are 
too weak to effectively support employees in pursuing their rights. Trade unions, which are 
distrusted by many citizens as they are being associated with the former socialist regimes, 
struggle with steadily declining membership rates. In 2004, these had dropped to 17 per cent 
of all employees in Hungary, 22 per cent in the Czech Republic (2003 figure) and 31 per cent 
in Slovakia (CEC, 2006c, p. 25). Slovenia, in contrast, stands out with a relatively high 
unionisation rate of 44 per cent (CEC, 2006c, p. 25). Even there, however, less than half of 
all employees are organised in a trade union. Compared to countries like Denmark or 
Sweden, with unionisation rates of around 80 per cent (CEC, 2006c, p. 25), this still seems 
rather modest. Other civil society organisations have only developed rather recently and 
struggle with a steady shortage of resources. Employees who may want to invoke their rights 
have thus too little support from societal organisations. Moreover, procedures for involving 
societal organisations in judicial proceedings have remained at a rather minimalist level in 
most countries. In general, interest associations may only support individual employees in 
legal proceedings relating to discrimination, as called for by the equality Directives. It is only 
in Hungary that societal groups may initiate, under certain conditions, discrimination-related 
proceedings themselves, without an individual being involved. In other areas and in the other 
three countries, however, the possibility of actio-popularis claims as a replacement for 
individual litigation does not exist. 
(3) Equal Treatment Bodies – promising babies with teething problems: Another way of 
supporting individuals in pursuing their rights is the creation of independent public bodies 
that offer advice and assistance to individuals who feel that their rights have been violated. In 
those countries that have so far succeeded in creating such bodies, they certainly represent 
a valuable instrument for giving effect to the principle of equality in practice. However, all of 
the existing bodies are plagued by a lack of visibility, institutional standing and resources so 
that their actual performance has so far lagged behind their formal competences. Due to the 12 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
political problems surrounding the transposition of the equality Directives, finally, the Czech 
Republic has not yet managed to create a proper Equal Treatment Body. 
(4) Shortcomings in the organisation of the judiciary: Lacking resources in the court systems 
make for lengthy court proceedings in some of our countries. According to our information, 
the usual period until a first-instance ruling is achieved in the field of labour law ranges from 
about one year in Slovenia, fourteen months in Slovakia, between one and two years in 
Hungary, and up to three years in the Czech Republic. While one year seems to be a 
relatively common length of proceedings in Western Europe as well, a duration of two or 
three years definitely has a negative effect on people’s willingness to go to court in the first 
place. Especially in the Czech Republic, moreover, there is a lack of attention for rulings by 
other courts, resulting in a situation where similar cases are often decided differently by 
different courts. 
(5) A lack of skilled inspectors and determination strains the work of labour inspectorates: 
The problem in our four countries seems to be less the absolute number of inspectors in 
charge of monitoring compliance with labour law provisions or a lack of competences to act 
directly against cases of non-compliance. Instead, there are three other reasons to explain 
why many observers criticise the labour inspectorates for being ineffective in ensuring 
compliance with working time and equal treatment law. First, the labour inspectorates in the 
four countries focus heavily on issues of occupational safety and health and on combating 
undeclared work. As most resources are deployed on these topics, not much is left for 
monitoring working time or equality issues. Second, inspectors often have a technical 
background and therefore lack expertise in the fields of our Directives. Third, there were 
reports from employee representatives, especially in Slovakia and Slovenia, accusing the 
labour inspectorates of having too close relations to employers and deliberately sparing 
companies that are in an economically tense situation. Despite these problems, there have 
been recent efforts to improve the organisational structures and the capacities of the labour 
inspectorates in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, by contrast, recent reforms 
by the centre-right government rather yielded in the opposite direction, involving a reduction 
of, rather than an increase in, the number of inspectors. 
As a result of these cumulated problems, many of the legal provisions that entered the 
statute books in order to fulfil the EU’s social policy acquis have so far largely remained dead 
letters. This is not to deny that there are differences in degree between the four countries 
and that, over the past decade, they all made efforts to improve the functioning of their 
enforcement systems. Yet, many more reforms are still needed to arrive at a satisfactory 
level of practical compliance on the ground. Continuing administrative reforms of the court 
systems and the labour inspectorates, public information campaigns about employment 
rights or financial support for civil society organisations are among the strategies that our 
focus group discussions in the CEECs revealed as promising steps to improve the situation. I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 13 
Against the background of our findings on both legal and practical implementation in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, the concluding section will discuss the 
implications of these results for extending the worlds of compliance typology to the new 
member states. 
 
4. How Many Worlds of Compliance in the EU27? 
As outlined above, our study of the implementation of three EU Directives from the fields of 
working time regulation and equal treatment in four CEECs revealed considerable general 
obstacles to practical application of the law, with relatively similar patterns in all four 
countries studied. By contrast, their performance is much better at the transposition stage of 
the implementation cycle. In fact, it should be mentioned here that in terms of pure 
transposition of EU Directives into national law, it seems possible that the new member 
states might even perform systematically better than the old ones – though we would need a 
broader empirical basis to substantiate this claim on a general basis. When presenting the 
six-monthly Internal Market Scoreboard to the press in February 2006, Competition 
Commissioner McCreevy indeed said that the results from new member states were 
generally better, highlighting that the average transposition deficit for this group was 1.2 per 
cent but 1.9 per cent for the EU15 (Agence Europe 22 February 2006: 7). 
The true hurdles for good compliance with EU standards are hence not a lack of political will 
or any transposition-impeding conditions within the political and/or administrative systems. 
Rather, the main obstacles are strained economies with elevated rates of unemployment and 
worker-unfriendly employment conditions; court systems lacking resources and knowledge 
concerning EU law; and finally also an inadequate organisation of labour inspectorates. 
While we found a clear pattern of lacking application and enforcement of EU law in all four 
member states studied, there seems to be no systematic pattern of ‘revenge’. Transposition 
processes do continue, sometimes quite successfully, even after EU accession. Among our 
cases, there were three examples of continued transposition efforts after accession. This can 
be interpreted to suggest that we should definitely not speak about a ‘world of revenge’. The 
existence of such a world would, first of all, presuppose an element of decision to misbehave 
in order to take revenge for the high pressure exerted by the Commission in the pre-
accession phase. We did not find any clear evidence to that effect. Furthermore, figures from 
the European Commission show that the transposition rates of our four new member states 14 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
have steadily increased, rather than decreased, since accession.
12 Secondly, a ‘world of 
revenge’ would imply that the enforcement and application problems are particularly severe 
with regard to European law. By contrast, our results suggest that the crucial hurdles for 
better street-level compliance with ‘foreign’ law are the very same ones that also hamper 
proper application of ‘home-made’ standards. This suggests that what exists in the four CEE 
countries studied is rather a pattern similar to what is typical for a few countries in the EU15, 
i.e. insufficient enforcement systems and, as a result, systematic failures at the application 
stage. 
Overall, therefore, what we observe in the four countries is a combination of political 
contestation at the transposition stage, and quite systematic non-compliance at the 
enforcement and application stage. It should be mentioned that the pattern is certainly not in 
accordance with the style of literal translation of Directives in the CEECs (as discussed in the 
literature and mentioned in our introduction). By contrast, the pattern we found in our recent 
empirical work is quite similar to two
13 of the countries in the ‘old’ EU15, Ireland and Italy. 
Both feature procedures characterised by domestic politics considerations when it comes to 
transposition and have clearly inappropriate enforcement systems.
14  
To capture this combination of politicised transposition and systematic shortcomings in 
enforcement and application, we suggest a fourth category: the ‘world of dead letters’. 
Countries belonging to this cluster of our typology may transpose EU Directives in a 
compliant manner, depending on the prevalent political constellation among domestic actors, 
but then there is non-compliance at the later stage of monitoring and enforcement. In this 
group of countries, what is written on the statute books simply does not become effective in 
practice. Shortcomings in the court systems, the labour inspections and finally also in civil 
society systems are among the detrimental factors accounting for this.  
The typical process patterns of our extended typology of four worlds of compliance, and the 
countries belonging to each cluster, are summarised in Table 1. 
                                                       
12 See the tables on ‘Progress in notification of national measures implementing directives’ since mid-2004, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/eulaw/index_en.htm. For example, the Czech Republic improved its 
transposition rate from 89.88 per cent in August 2004 to 99.63 per cent in August 2006. For Slovakia, the figures are 
92.21 and 99.67, respectively. The other two countries show similar developments, although starting from a 
somewhat higher level. Note, however, that official transposition rates do not allow any insights on the completeness 
or correctness of the measures communicated to the Commission. 
13 Note that in Greece and Portugal, whose typical procedural pattern during the transposition stage was neglect, 
we also found significant enforcement and application problems (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, p. 275). 
14 Therefore, we originally classified these two countries as belonging to what we then called the world of neglect if 
the focus is placed on the implementation process as a whole, and not only on transposition (Falkner, Treib, 
Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005, chapter 15). With our new cases at hand, however, and with a view to ensuring a 
systematic and comprehensible typology, it seems preferable to conceptualise an additional world of compliance to 
grasp the new combination of typical patterns in the different phases. Consequently, we now subsume Ireland and 
Italy, along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, under a separate world of compliance. I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 15 
Table 1: Four Worlds of Compliance 
  World of Law 
Observance 
World of 
Domestic Politics 
World of Dead 
Letters 
World of Trans-
position Neglect 
Process pattern 
at stage of trans-
position 
+  o o – 
Process pattern 
at stage of 
practical 
implementation 
+ + –  +/– 
Countries Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden 
(3) 
Austria, Belgium 
Germany, Nether-
lands, Spain, UK 
(6) 
Ireland, Italy, 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia (6) 
France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, 
Portugal (4) 
+  = respect of rule of law; o  = political pick-and-choose; –  = neglect 
Three issues deserve special highlighting: First, our typology refers to typical process 
patterns, not to implementation outcomes. It is thus not tantamount to groups of good, 
mediocre or bad performers. Therefore, the typology can fruitfully serve as a filter deciding 
which theoretical factors explain implementation processes in which country settings.
15 
Second, each world refers to a combination of typical process patterns in the two major 
phases of implementing EU Directives: transposition and application/enforcement. 
Sometimes, the same pattern applies to both phases (e.g. dutiful transposition and effective 
practical implementation in the world of law observance), and sometimes each phase shows 
a peculiar pattern (e.g. politicised transposition and major shortcomings in enforcement and 
application in the world of dead letters). This implies that many more worlds would be 
theoretically possible than those we specify. Our decision was to create useful labels for 
those constellations we actually found empirically rather than cataloguing potential forms.  
Third, the titles of our worlds refer to the most significant characteristic of each cluster. This 
characteristic is not necessarily present in both stages of the implementation process. This 
was a compromise solution for the sake of offering ‘telling’ labels that are easy to capture 
and to memorise. At least at first glance, the label ‘world of dead letters’ is closer to the 
outcome than a process pattern. However, we understand it as saying: first, there is 
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transposition into rather good domestic laws, with domestic politics being crucial, but then 
these countries lack proper institutions and processes for turning these laws into action. 
In overall terms, we should close with a word of caution. As outlined in the introduction, this 
paper discussed the findings of a research project on three Directives in four CEE countries. 
It goes without saying that more case and country studies would be useful in order to judge 
the overall compliance record, and the typical implementation patters more generally, in 
Central and Eastern Europe. There are, in any case, signs that the pattern of relatively good 
transposition but flawed enforcement, which is typical for the world of dead letters, may also 
be found in further CEECs, such as Poland (Leiber, 2005). And the fact that many of the 
problems revealed in terms of control and enforcement arise from shortcomings in the 
bureaucracies and the court systems, or even from the weakness of civil society and interest 
groups, suggests that the pattern will most probably not be restricted to a few policy areas. I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 17 
References 
Ágh, A. (2003) Anticipatory and Adaptive Europeanization in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian 
Centre for Democracy Studies). 
CEC (2001) ‘European Governance – A White Paper’. COM(2001) 428 final (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities). 
CEC (2004) ‘Commission takes Member States to the European Court of Justice for failing to 
implement EU antidiscrimination rules’. Press Release IP/04/1512 (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, 20 December 2004). 
CEC (2006a) ‘Croatia 2006 Progress Report’. COM(2006) 649 final, SEC(2006) 1385 
(Brussels: Commission of the European Communities). 
CEC (2006b) ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2006 Progress Report’. 
COM(2006) 649 final, SEC(2006) 1387 (Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities). 
CEC (2006c) Industrial Relations in Europe (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities). 
CEC (2006d) ‘Key Findings of the May 2006 Monitoring Reports on Bulgaria and Romania’. 
MEMO 06/201 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities). 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1991) ‘Introduction’. In Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. 
(eds.)  The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), pp. 1-38. 
Dimitrova, A. L. and Steunenberg, B. (2004) ‘Conclusions: The “End of History” of 
Enlargement or the Beginning of a New Research Agenda?’ In Dimitrova, A. L. (ed.) 
Driven to Change: The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the East 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 179-93. 
Douglas, M. (2001) ‘Culture as Explanation: Cultural Concerns’. In Smelser, N. J. and Baltes, 
P. B. (eds.) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier), pp. 3147-51. 
Duina, F. G. (1997) ‘Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union’. International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 155-79. 
Duina, F. G. (1999) Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Common Market (Albany: 
State University of New York Press). 
Duina, F. G. and Blithe, F. (1999) ‘Nation-States and Common Markets: The Institutional 
Conditions for Acceptance’. Review of International Political Economy Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 
494-530. 
Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M. and Treib, O. (2007) ‘Worlds of Compliance: Why Leading 
Approaches to EU Implementation Are Only “Sometimes-True Theories”’. European 
Journal of Political Research (forthcoming). 
Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S. (2005) Complying with Europe: EU 
Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Goetz, K. H. (2005) ‘The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe’. In 
Bulmer, S. and Lequesne, C. (eds.) The Member States of the European Union (New 
York: Oxford University Press), pp. 254-80. 18 — Falkner / Treib  / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — I H S 
 
Goetz, K. H. (2006) ‘Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization’. IHS Working 
Paper Political Science Series, No. 109 (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies), 
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_109.pdf. 
Haverland, M. (2000) ‘National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of 
Institutional Veto Points’. Journal of Public Policy Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 83-103. 
Knill, C. and Lenschow, A. (1998) ‘Coping with Europe: The Impact of British and German 
Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy’. Journal of 
European Public Policy Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 595-614. 
Knill, C. and Lenschow, A. (2000) ‘Do New Brooms Really Sweep Cleaner? Implementation 
of New Instruments in EU Environmental Policy’. In Lenschow, A. (ed.) Implementing 
EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press), pp. 251-82. 
Leiber, S. (2005) ‘Implementation of EU Social Policy in Poland: Is there a Different “Eastern 
World of Compliance”?’ conference paper, Ninth Biennial International Conference of 
the European Unions Studies Association (31 March-2 April 2005), Austin, Texas. 
Linden, R. H. (2002) ‘Conclusion: International Organizations and East Europe – Bringing 
Parallel Tracks Together’. In Linden, R. H. (ed.) Norms and Nannies. The Impact of 
International Organizations on the Central and East European States (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 369-82. 
Maniokas, K. (2004) ‘The Method of the European Union’s Enlargement to the East: A 
Critical Appraisal’. In Dimitrova, A. L. (ed.) Driven to Change: The European Union’s 
Enlargement Viewed from the East (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 17-
37. 
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of 
Politics (New York: Free Press). 
Pierson, P. (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’. 
American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 251-67. 
Prondzynski, F. v. (1987) Implementation of the Equality Directives (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities). 
Prondzynski, F. v. (1988) Network of Experts on the Implementation of the Equality Directives 
– Final Consolidated Report (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities). 
Pülzl, H. and Treib, O. (2006) ‘Policy Implementation’. In Fischer, F., Miller, G. J. and Sidney, 
M. S. (eds.) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods (Boca 
Raton: CRC Press), pp. 89-107. 
Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S. and Heiko, K. (2005) ‘The Impact of EU Political 
Conditionality’. In Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) The Europeanization of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 29-50. 
Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S. and Knobel, H. (2003) ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: 
The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’. Journal of 
Common Market Studies Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 495-518. 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’. Journal of 
European Public Policy Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 661-79. 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005a) ‘Conclusions: The Impact of the EU on the 
Accession Countries’. In Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) The I H S — Falkner / Treib / Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? — 19 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 
210-28. 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005b) ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing the 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe’. In Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, 
U. (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), pp. 1-28. 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2007) ‘Candidate Countries and Conditionality’. In 
Graziano, P. and Vink, M. P. (eds.) Europeanization: New Research Agendas 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 88-101. 
Schmidt, V. A. (2002) The Futures of European Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Sedelmeier, U. (2006) ‘Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States’. Living 
Reviews in European Governance Vol. 1, No. 3, http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-
3. 
Sissenich, B. (2002) ‘The Diffusion of EU Social and Employment Legislation in Poland and 
Hungary’. In Linden, R. H. (ed.) Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International 
Organizations on the Central and East European States (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield), pp. 287-315. 
Sissenich, B. (2005) ‘The Transfer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary’. In 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 157-77. 
Swidler, A. (2001) ‘Cultural Expression and Action’. In Smelser, N. J. and Baltes, P. B. (eds.) 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier), 
pp. 3063-69. 
Thelen, K. (1999) ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’. Annual Review of 
Political Science Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 369-404. 
Thelen, K. and Steinmo, S. (1992) ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’. In 
Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 
1-32. 
Treib, O. (2006) ‘Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs’. Living 
Reviews in European Governance Vol. 1, No. 1, http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-
1. 
Tsebelis, G. (1995) ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism’. British Journal of Political Science 
Vol. 25, pp. 289-325. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Authors: Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib  
 
Title: Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU15 Compared to New Member States 
 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series 112 
 
Editor: Sylvia Kritzinger 
Associate Editor: Inge Korneck  
 
ISSN: 1605-8003 
© 2007 by the Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna •  +43 1 59991-0 • Fax +43 1 59991-555 • http://www.ihs.ac.at  
  
ISSN: 1605-8003 
 